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Abstract
ε-differential privacy is a leading protection setting, focused by design on individual privacy. Many
applications, such as in the medical / pharmaceutical domains, would rather posit privacy at a group
level, furthermore of unknown size, a setting in which classical budget scaling tricks typically cannot
guarantee non-trivial privacy levels. We call this privacy setting integral privacy.
In this paper, we study a major problem of machine learning and statistics with related applications
in domains cited above that have recently met with substantial press: sampling. Our formal contribution
is twofolds: we provide a general theory for sampling to be integrally private, and we show how
to achieve integral privacy with guarantees on the approximation of the true (non-private) density.
Our theory introduces ε-mollifiers, subsets of densities whose sampling is guaranteed to be integrally
private. Guaranteed approximation bounds of the true density are obtained via the boosting theory as it
was originally formulated: we learn sufficient statistics in an ε-mollifier of exponential families using
classifiers, which brings guaranteed approximation and convergence rates that degrade gracefully
with the privacy budget, under weak assumptions. Approximation guarantees cover the mode capture
problem. Experimental results against private kernel density estimation and private GANs displays the
quality of our results, in particular for high privacy regimes.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, (ε-)differential privacy (DP) has evolved as the leading statistical protection model
for individuals Dwork and Roth [2014], as it guarantees plausible deniability regarding the presence of an
individual in the input of a mechanism, from the observation of its output.
DP has however a limitation inherent to its formulation regarding group protection: what if we wish to
extend the guarantee to subsets of the input, not just individuals ? This is particularly relevant to medical /
pharmaceutical applications where privacy needs to be carried out at a subpopulation level (being affected
by particular conditions, purchasing specific drugs, etc Palanisamy et al. [2017]).
When the group size is limited, it is a simple textbook matter to extend the privacy guarantee by
scaling the privacy budget by the maximum size, see e.g. Gaboardi [2016, Proposition 1.13]: if we want to
protect groups of size k, we just divide ε by k to get the same privacy guarantee as for individuals in ε-DP.
One might object that this is not very efficient to retain information as standard randomized mechanisms
would get their variance scaled proportionally by k [Dwork and Roth, 2014, Section 3], but this can be
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reasonable for small group sizes Palanisamy et al. [2017]. When the maximum group size is unknown, this
approach definitely does not work anymore as any non-trivial privacy requirement results in a vanishing
privacy budget – and therefore, in a variance that diverges with the input size. This setting is however
arguably the most interesting to protect groups as in the worst case, group sizes may not be available.
One might wonder whether such a strong privacy regime – to which we refer to as integral privacy – is
actually achievable as it requires, in the worst case, to extend plausible deniability to the whole input itself,
regardless of its size. Classical DP goes with some privacy-dependent loss of information, so we may also
ask what is the information loss to pay to lift DP to the level of integral privacy.
In this paper, we propose a general mechanism to achieve such a non-trivial privacy regime, with
guaranteed approximation bounds, for the problem of sampling. Sampling at large is an old and major
problem in machine learning and statistics [Fix and Hodges, 1951, Hastings, 1970, Metropolis et al., 1953,
Silverman, 1986]. Its private counterpart is more recent [Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018, Geumlek et al.,
2017, Machanavajjhala et al., 2008, Rubin, 1993, Wang et al., 2015], but the emergency to tackle the
problem is clear, with a regularly expanding list of data privacy breaches in medical / pharmaceutical
systems Lord [2018], Rubinstein et al. [2016], Farell [2017].
The task of sampling in a private setting ideally entails two objectives of being accurate and private.
Without getting into technicalities yet, suppose we have access to i.i.d. samples (say, D) from a fixed
but unknown target density P whose support is denoted X. Let A(.) denote any algorithm taking D as
input and returning an observation by sampling a density Q — which therefore depends on D (Q can
be implicit, like for GANs). The first objective is that Q be accurate wrt P : I(P,Q) ≤ b, where I is any
suitable form of divergence and b bounds the approximation error. The second objective is that sampling
from Q must never disclose too much information about the input dataset D used to learn Q: in classical
ε-DP,
Pr[A(D) ∈ S]
Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) ,∀S ⊆ X,∀D ≈ D
′ . (1)
Here, ε is the DP budget [Dwork and Roth, 2014] and ≈ means that samples differ from one observation
only.
Our contribution can be split in three parts:
. we introduce a simple trick that allows private sampling from non necessarily private densities without
using the randomization toolkit of DP [Dwork and Roth, 2014]. This trick considers subsets of densities
with prescribed range, that we call mollifiers1, which makes their sampling private. Related tricks, albeit
significantly more constrained and/or tailored to weaker models of privacy, have recently been used in
the context of private Bayesian inference, sampling and regression [Dimitratakis et al., 2014, Section 3],
[Mir, 2013, Chapter 5], [Wang et al., 2015, Theorem 1], [Wasserman and Zhou, 2010, Section 4.1]. A key
benefit is privacy holds even when we remove the adjacency condition of (1) — and therefore the same
size constraint as well, resulting in a privacy guarantee stronger than for classical (central) or local DP
that we denote as integral privacy;
. in this set of mollifier densities, we show how to learn a density with guaranteed approximation wrt
target P , and introduce a computationally efficient algorithm for this task, MBDE. To get guaranteed
approximation of P , we use a celebrated theory of statistical learning: boosting [Schapire and Freund,
2012]. Boosting was previously used once in the context of differential privacy to privatize database
queries [Dwork et al., 2010]. Compared to this work, we use the ingredients of boosting as they were
initially designed: a weak learner outputting classifiers different from random guessing. Hence, we bring
density estimation in contact with supervised classification and our technique learns a density out of
1It bears superficial similarities with functional mollifiers [Gilbarg and Trudinger, 2001, Section 7.2].
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target P Q learned
Our method Private KDE DPGAN
ε = 0.25 ε = 100 ε = 5000
Figure 1: Our method vs private KDE [Aldà and Rubinstein, 2017] and DPGAN [Xie et al., 2018] on a
ring Gaussian mixture (see Section 5). Remark the values of ε (chosen for the densities to look alike), and
the fact that the GAN is subject to mode collapse.
classifiers. Those classifiers are used to craft the sufficient statistics of an exponential family — hence,
with the successes of deep learning, those sufficient statistics can represent extremely complex mappings
resulting in virtually arbitrarily diverse mollifier densities;
. we provide experimental results for MBDE against a state of the art approach for sampling from private
KDE [Aldà and Rubinstein, 2017], which displays the competitiveness and convenience of MBDE, in
particular when ε is small, making our approach a good fit for privacy demanding applications. We also
performed comparisons with a private generative approach [Xie et al., 2018], which resulted in MBDE very
significantly outperforming that one — Figure 1 provides a snapshot example of experimental results
comparing the various approaches (δ = 0.1 for Xie et al. [2018]).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. § 2 presents related work. § 3 introduces key definitions and
basic results. § 4 introduces our algorithm, MBDE, and states its key privacy and approximation properties.
§ 5 presents experiments and two last Sections respectively discuss and conclude our paper. Proofs and
additional experiments are postponed to an Appendix.
2 Related work
Figure 2 summarizes the various approaches for sampling when the input is an i.i.d. sample from a
target P (notations from the Introduction appear in the Figure), and the four essential locations where
differential-privacy-style protection can be enforced. One highly desirable feature of differential privacy
(DP) is that it survives post-processing. Hence, if we protect upstream for differential privacy the input
sample D directly as shown in Figure 2, then all further steps will be private as well and there will be
no restriction on the algorithms used to come up with S. A significant advantage for this process is that
standard tools from differential privacy can be directly used [Dwork and Roth, 2014, Section 3]. The
problem however is that standard tools operate by noisifying the signal and the more upstream is the
noise, the less tailored to the task at hand it can be and ultimately the worst it should be (accuracy-wise)
for the downstream output. A second possibility is to rather learn a private implicit generative model
like a private GAN [Xie et al., 2018]. This makes sampling easy, but there is a significant downside:
noisification for privacy makes GAN training much trickier [Triastcyn and Faltings, 2018], granted that
even without noise, training GANs already faces significant challenges (like mode collapse, see Figure 1).
One can instead opt for a general private Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling [Wang et al., 2015], but
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Figure 2: Different approaches that allow (differentially) private sampling: (1) protecting the input dataset
D sampled from true distribution P ; (2) learning a private sampler (e.g. Monte Carlo) or generative model
(e.g. GAN) from D; (3) learning a private density Q from D and then sampling from it; (4) learning a
density Q whose sampling is private (but releasing Q may not be private). The grey area locates our
contribution.
convergence is in weak asymptotic form and privacy typically biases likelihoods, priors.
Somewhat closer to ours is a third set of techniques that directly learn a private density. A broad
literature has been developed early for discrete distributions [Machanavajjhala et al., 2008] (and references
therein). For a general Q not necessarily discrete, more sophisticated approaches have been tried, most of
which exploit randomisation and the basic toolbox of differential privacy [Dwork and Roth, 2014, Section
3]: given non-private Q˜, one compute the sensitivity s of the approach, then use a standard mechanism
M(Q˜, s) to compute a private Q. If mechanism delivers ε-DP, like Laplace mechanism [Dwork and Roth,
2014], then we get an ε-DP density. Such general approaches have been used for Q being the popular
kernel density estimation (KDE, [Givens and Hoeting, 2013]) with variants [Aldà and Rubinstein, 2017,
Hall et al., 2013, Rubinstein and Aldà, 2017].
A convenient way to fit a private Q is to approximate it in a specific function space, being Sobolev
[Duchi et al., 2013a, Hall et al., 2013, Wasserman and Zhou, 2010], Bernstein polynomials [Aldà and
Rubinstein, 2017], Chebyshev polynomials [Thaler et al., 2012], and then compute the coefficients in
a differentially private way. This approach suffers several drawbacks. First, the sensitivity s depends
on the quality of the approximation: increasing it can blow-up sensitivity in an exponential way [Aldà
and Rubinstein, 2017, Rubinstein and Aldà, 2017], which translates to a significantly larger amount of
noise. Second, one always pays the price of the underlying function space’s assumptions, even if limited
to smoothness [Duchi et al., 2013a,b, Hall et al., 2013, Wainwright, 2014, Wasserman and Zhou, 2010],
continuity or boundedness [Aldà and Rubinstein, 2017, Duchi et al., 2013a,b, Thaler et al., 2012]. We
note that we have framed the general approach to private density estimation in ε-DP. While the state of
the art we consider investigate privacy models that are closely related, not all are related to (ε) differential
privacy. Some models opt for a more local (or "on device", because the sample size is one) form of
differential privacy [Differential privacy team, Apple, 2017, Duchi et al., 2013a,b, Wainwright, 2014],
others for relaxed forms of differential privacy [Hall et al., 2013, Rubinstein and Aldà, 2017]. Finally,
while all previous techniques formally investigate privacy (eq. (1)), the quality of the approximation
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of Q with respect to P is much less investigated. The state of the art investigates criteria of the form
J(P,Q)
.
= EI(P,Q) where the expectation involves all relevant randomizations, including sampling of
S, mechanism M , etc. [Duchi et al., 2013a,b, Wainwright, 2014, Wasserman and Zhou, 2010]; minimax
rates J∗ .= infQ supP J(P,Q) are also known [Duchi et al., 2013a,b, Wainwright, 2014]. Pointwise
approximation bounds are available [Aldà and Rubinstein, 2017] but require substantial assumptions on
the target density or sensitivity for the approach to remain tractable.
3 Basic definitions and results
. Basic definitions: let X be a set (typically, X = Rd) and let P be the target density. Without loss of
generality, all distributions considered have the same support, X. We are given a dataset D = {xi}, where
each xi ∼ P is an i.i.d. observation. As part of our goal is to learn and then sample from a distribution Q
such that KL(P,Q) is small, where KL denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence:
KL(P,Q) =
∫
X
log
(
P
Q
)
dP (2)
(we assume for the sake of simplicity the same base measure for all densities). We pick the KL divergence
for its popularity and the fact that it is the canonical divergence for broad sets of distributions [Amari and
Nagaoka, 2000].
. Boosting: in supervised learning, a classifier is a function c : X → R where sign(c(x)) ∈ {−1, 1}
denotes a class. We assume that c(x) ∈ [− log 2, log 2] and so the output of c is bounded. This is not a
restrictive assumption: many other work in the boosting literature make the same boundedness assumption
[Schapire and Singer, 1999]. We now present the cornerstone of boosting, the weak learning assumption.
It involves a weak learner, which is an oracle taking as inputs two distributions P and Q and is required to
always return a classifier c that weakly guesses the sampling from P vs Q.
Definition 1 (WLA) Fix γP , γQ ∈ (0, 1] two constants. We say that WeakLearner(., .) satisfies the
weak learning assumption (WLA) for γP , γQ iff for any P,Q, WeakLearner(P,Q) returns a classifier c
satisfying
1
c∗
· EP [c] > γP and 1
c∗
· EQ[−c] > γQ. (3)
where c∗ = ess supx∈X |c(x)|.
Remark that as the two inputs P and Q become "closer" in some sense to one another, it is harder to satisfy
the WLA. However, this is not a problem as whenever this happens, we shall have successfully learned
P through Q. The classical theory of boosting would just assume one constraint over a distribution M
whose marginals over classes would be P and Q [Kearns, 1988], but our definition can in fact easily be
shown to coincide with that of boosting. A boosting algorithm is an algorithm which has only access to a
weak learner and, throughout repeated calls, typically combines the weak classifiers it receives to end up
with a combination significantly more accurate than its parts. The trick of boosting that we shall employ,
as exemplified in Schapire [1990], is to train the weak learner on inputs that carefully change throughout
the course of learning, so that the weak learner’s outputs are indeed weak with respect to their respective
tweaked inputs but the global combination gets stronger on the boosting algorithm’s original input.
. Differential privacy, intregral privacy: we introduce a user-defined parameter, ε, which represents a
privacy budget; ε > 0 and the smaller it is, the stronger the privacy demand. Hereafter, D and D′ denote
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Figure 3: Left: example of mollifiers for two values of ε, ε = 1 (red curves) or ε = 0.2 (blue curves). For
that latter case, we also indicate in light blue the necessary range of values to satisfy (5), and in dark blue
a sufficient range that allows to satisfy (5). Right: schematic depiction of how one can transform any
set of finite densities in an ε-mollifier without losing the modes and keeping derivatives up to a positive
constant scaling.
input datasets from X, and D ≈ D′ denotes the predicate that D and D′ differ by one observation. Let A
denote a randomized algorithm that takes as input datasets and outputs samples.
Definition 2 For any fixed ε > 0, A is said to meet ε-differential privacy (DP) iff, it always holds that
Pr[A(D)∈S]≤ exp(ε)·Pr[A(D′)∈S],∀S⊆X,∀D≈D′. (4)
A meets ε-integral privacy (IP) iff (4) holds when alleviating the ∀D ≈ D′ constraint for a more general
∀D,D′.
Note that integral privacy is a significantly stronger notion of privacy since by removing the D ≈ D′
constraint, we implicitly remove the constraint that D and D′ are neighbors or have the same size.
. Mollifiers. We now introduce a property for sets of densities that shall be crucial for privacy.
Definition 3 Let M be a set of densities with the same support. M is said to be an ε-mollifier for some
ε > 0 iff
Q(x) ≤ exp(ε) ·Q′(x),∀Q,Q′ ∈M,∀x ∈ X. (5)
Before stating how we can simply transform any set of densities with finite range into an ε-mollifier, let
us show why such sets are important for integrally private sampling.
Lemma 4 Suppose there exists ε > 0 and ε-mollifier M such that A samples densities within M. Then A
is ε-integrally private.
(Proof in Appendix, Section 8.1) Notice that we do not need to require that D and D′ be sampled from the
same density P . This trick which essentially allows to get "privacy for free" using the fact that sampling
carries out the necessary randomization we need to get privacy, is not new: a similar, more specific trick
was designed for Bayesian learning in Wang et al. [2015] and in fact the first statement of [Wang et al.,
2015, Theorem 1] implements in disguise a specific ε-mollifier related to one we use, Mε (see below). We
now show examples of mollifiers and properties they can bear.
Our examples are featured in the simple case where the support of the mollifier is [0, 1] and densities
have finite range and are continuous: see Figure 3 (left). The two ranges indicated are featured to depict
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Algorithm 1 MBDE(P, T, ε,Q0)
1: for t = 1, . . . , T do
2: θt(ε)←
(
ε
ε+4 log(2)
)t
3: ct ←WeakLearner(P,Qt)
4: Qt ∝ Qt−1 · exp(θt(ε) · ct)
5: end forOutput QT
necessary or sufficient conditions on the overall range of a set of densities to be a mollifier. For the
necessary part, we note that any continuous density must have 1 in its range of values (otherwise its total
mass cannot be unit), so if it belongs to an ε-mollifier, its maximal value cannot be ≥ exp(ε) and its
minimal value cannot be ≤ exp(−ε). We end up with the range in light blue, in which any ε-mollifier has
to fit. For the sufficiency part, we indicate in dark blue a possible range of values, [exp(−ε/2), exp(ε/2)],
which gives a sufficient condition for the range of all elements in a set M for this set to be an ε-mollifier2.
Let us denote more formally this set as Mε.
Notice that as ε → 0, any ε-mollifier converges to a singleton. In particular, all elements of Mε
converge in distribution to the uniform distribution, which would also happen for sampling using standard
mechanisms of differential privacy [Dwork and Roth, 2014], so we do not lose qualitatively in terms of
privacy. However, because we have no constraint apart from the range constraint to be inMε, this freedom
is going to be instrumental to get guaranteed approximations of P via the boosting theory. Figure 3 (right)
also shows how a simple scale-and-shift procedure allows to fit any finite density in Mε while keeping
some of its key properties, so "mollifying" a finite density in Mε in this way do not change its modes,
which is an important property for sampling, and just scales its gradients by a positive constant, which is
is an important property for learning and optimization.
4 Mollifier density estimation with approximation guarantees
We now present our approach depicted in Figure 2. The cornerstone is an algorithm that (i) learns an
explicit density in an ε-mollifier and (ii) with approximation guarantees with respect to the target P .
Recall that, from Lemma 4, sampling from the output of such an algorithm is ε-integrally private because
of (i), so we can focus in showing (i+ii). This algorithm, MBDE, for Mollified Boosted Density Estimation,
is depicted above. It uses a weak learner whose objective is to distinguish between the target P and the
current guessed density Qt — the index indicates the iterative nature of the algorithm. Qt is progressively
refined using the weak learner’s output classifier ct, for a total number of user-fixed iterations T . We
start boosting by setting Q0 as the starting distribution, typically a simple non-informed (to be private)
distribution such as a standard Gaussian. The classifier is then aggregated into Qt−1 in the following way:
Qt =
exp(θt(ε)ct)Qt−1∫
exp(θt(ε)ct)Qt−1dx
= exp (〈θ(ε), c〉 − ϕ(θ(ε)))Q0. (6)
where θ(ε) = (θ1(ε), . . . , θt(ε)), c = (c1, . . . , ct) (from now on, c denotes the vector of all classifiers) and
ϕ(θ(ε)) is the log-normalizer given by
ϕ(θ(ε)) = log
∫
X
exp (〈θ(ε), c〉) dQ0. (7)
2We have indeed Q(x)/Q′(x) ≤ exp(ε/2)/ exp(−ε/2) = exp(ε),∀Q,Q′ ∈Mε,∀x ∈ X.
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This process repeats until t = T and the proposed distribution is Qε(x;D) = QT . It is not hard to see that
Qε(x;D) is an exponential family with natural parameter θ(ε), sufficient statistics c, and base measure
Q0 [Amari and Nagaoka, 2000]. We now show three formal results on MBDE.
. Sampling from QT is ε-integrally private — Recall Mε is the set of densities whose range is in
exp[−ε/2, ε/2]. We now show that the output QT of MBDE is in Mε, guaranteeing ε-integral privacy on
sampling (Lemma 4).
Theorem 5 QT ∈Mε.
(Proof in Appendix, Section 8.2) We observe that privacy comes with a price, as for example limε→0 θt(ε) =
0, so as we become more private, the updates on Q. become less and less significant and we somehow
flatten the learned density — as already underlined in Section 3, such a phenomenon is not a particularity
of our method as it would also be observed for standard mechanisms of differential privacy [Dwork and
Roth, 2014].
. MBDE approximates the target distribution in the boosting framework — As explained in Section
3, it is not hard to fit a density in Mε to make its sampling private. An important question is however what
guarantees of approximation can we still have with respect to P , given that P may not be in Mε. We now
give such guarantees to MBDE in the boosting framework, and we also show that the approximation is
within close order to the best possible given the constraint to fit Q. in Mε. We start with the former result,
and for this objective include the iteration index t in the notations from Definition 1 since the actual weak
learning guarantees may differ amongst iterations, even when they are still within the prescribed bounds
(as e.g. for ct).
Theorem 6 For any t ≥ 1, suppose WeakLearner satisfies at iteration t the WLA for γtP , γtQ. Then we
have:
KL(P,Qt) ≤ KL(P,Qt−1)− θt(ε) · Λt, (8)
where (letting Γ(z) .= log(4/(5− 3z))):
Λt=
{
c∗tγ
t
P + Γ(γ
t
Q) if γ
t
Q ∈ [1/3, 1] ("high")
γtP + γ
t
Q − c
∗
t ·θt(ε)
2
if γtQ ∈ (0, 1/3) ("low")
. (9)
(Proof in Appendix, Section 8.3) Remark that in the high boosting regime, we are guaranteed that Λt ≥ 0
so the bound on the KL divergence is guaranteed to decrease. This is a regime we are more likely
to encounter during the first boosting iterations since Qt−1 and P are then easier to tell apart — we
can thus expect a larger γtQ. In the low boosting regime, the picture can be different since we need
γtP +γ
t
Q ≥ c∗t ·θt(ε)/2 to make the bound not vacuous. Since θt(ε)→t 0 exponentially fast, this constraint
is somewhat minor and we can also expect the bound on the KL divergence to also decrease in the low
boosting regime.
We now check that the guarantees we get are close to the best possible in an information-theoretic
sense given the two constraints: (i) Q is an exponential family as in (6) and (ii) Q ∈Mε. Let us define
Mexpε ⊂ Mε the set of such densities, where Q0 is fixed, and let ∆(Q) .= KL(P,Q0) − KL(P,Q).
Intuitively, the farther P is from Q0, the farther we should be able to get from Q0 to approximate P , and
so the larger should be ∆(Q). Notice that this would typically imply to be in the high boosting regime for
MBDE. For the sake of simplicity, we consider γP , γQ to be the same throughout all iterations.
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Theorem 7 We have
∆(Q) ≤ ε
2
, ∀Q ∈Mexpε , (10)
and if MBDE stays in the high boosting regime, then
∆(QT ) ≥ ε
2
·
{
γP + γQ
2
· (1− θT (ε))
}
. (11)
(Proof in Appendix, Section 8.4) Hence, as γP → 1 and γQ → 1, we have ∆(QT ) ≥ (ε/2) · (1− θT (ε))
and since θT (ε)→ 0 as T →∞, MBDE indeed reaches the information-theoretic limit in the high boosting
regime.
. MBDE and the capture of modes of P — Mode capture is a prominent problem in the area of generative
models [Tolstikhin et al., 2017]. We have already seen that enforcing mollification can be done while
keeping modes, but we would like to show that MBDE is indeed efficient at building some QT with
guarantees on mode capture. For this objective, we define for any B ⊆ X and density Q,
M(B,Q)
.
=
∫
B
dQ ; KL(P,Q;B)
.
=
∫
B
log
(
P
Q
)
dP, (12)
that are respectively the total mass of B on Q and the KL divergence between P and Q restricted to B.
Theorem 8 Suppose MBDE stays in the high boosting. Let h(x) .= ε+ 2x. Then ∀α ∈ [0, 1], ∀B ⊆ X, if
M(B,P ) ≥ ε · h((2− γP − γQ) · T )
h(α) · h(T ) , (13)
then M(B,QT ) ≥ (1− α)M(B,P )−KL(P,Q0;B).
(Proof in Appendix, Section 8.5) There is not much we can do to control KL(P,Q0;B) as this term
quantifies our luck in picking Q0 to approximate P in B but if this restricted KL divergence is small
compared to the mass of B, then we are guaranteed to capture a substantial part of it through QT . As a
mode, in particular "fat", would tend to have large mass over its region B, Theorem 8 says that we can
indeed hope to capture a significant part of it as long as we stay in the high boosting regime. As γP → 1
and γQ → 1, the condition on M(B,P ) in (13) vanishes with T and we end up capturing any fat region B
(and therefore, modes, assuming they represent "fatter" regions) whose mass is sufficiently large with
respect to KL(P,Q0;B).
To finish up this Section, recall that Mε is also defined (in disguise) and analyzed in [Wang et al.,
2015, Theorem 1] for posterior sampling. However, convergence [Wang et al., 2015, Section 3] does not
dig into specific forms for the likelihood of densities chosen — as a result and eventual price to pay, it
remains essentially in weak asymptotic form, and furthermore later on applied in the weaker model of
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. We exhibit particular choices for these mollifier densities, along with a specific
training algorithm to learn them, that allow for significantly better approximation, quantitatively and
qualitatively (mode capture) without even relaxing privacy.
5 Experiments
. Architectures (of Qt, private KDE and private GANs): we carried out experiments on a simulated
setting inspired by Aldà and Rubinstein [2017], to compare MBDE (implemented following its description
9
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Figure 4: Gaussian ring: densities obtained for DPB (upper row) against MBDE (lower row)
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Figure 5: Metrics for MBDE (blue): NLL (lower is better) and mode coverage (higher is better). Orange:
DPB (see text).
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in Section 4) against differentially private KDE [Aldà and Rubinstein, 2017]. To learn the sufficient
statistics for MBDE, we fit for each ct a neural network (NN) classifier:
X
tanh−−→
dense
R25 tanh−−→
dense
R25 tanh−−→
dense
R25 sigmoid−−−−→
dense
(0, 1), (14)
where X ∈ {R,R2} depending on the experiment. At each iteration t of boosting, ct is trained using
10000 samples from P and Qt−1 using Nesterov’s accelerated gradient descent with η = 0.01 based on
cross-entropy loss with 750 epochs. Random walk Metropolis-Hastings is used to sample from Qt−1 at
each iteration. For the number of boosting iterations in MBDE, we pick T = 3. This is quite a small
value but given the rate of decay of θt(ε) and the small dimensionality of the domain, we found it a good
compromise for complexity vs accuracy. Finally, we pick for Q0 a standard Gaussian (zero mean, identity
covariance).
. Contenders: we know of no integrally private sampling approach operating under conditions equivalent
to ours, so our main contender is going to be a particular state of the art ε-differentially private approach
which provides a private density, DPB [Aldà and Rubinstein, 2017]. We choose this approach because
digging in its technicalities reveal that its integral privacy budget would be roughly equivalent to ours,
mutatis mutandis. Here is why: this approach allows to sample a dataset of arbitrary size (say, k) while
keeping the same privacy budget, but needs to be scaled to accomodate integral privacy, while in our
case, MBDE allows to obtain integral privacy for one observation (k = 1), but its privacy budget needs
to be scaled to accomodate for larger k. It turns out that in both approaches, the scaling of the privacy
parameter to accomodate for arbitrary k and integral privacy is roughly the same. In our case, the change
is obvious: the privacy parameter ε is naturally scaled by k. In the case of Aldà and Rubinstein [2017], the
requirement of integral privacy multiplies the sensitivity3 by k, which implies that the Laplace mechanism
does not change only if ε is scaled by k [Dwork and Roth, 2014, Section 3.3].
We have also compared with a private GAN approach, which has the benefit to yield a simple sampler
but involves a weaker privacy model [Xie et al., 2018] (DPGAN). For DPB, we use a bandwidth kernel
and learn the bandwidth parameter via 10-fold cross-validation. For DPGAN, we train the WGAN base
model using batch sizes of 128 and 10000 epochs, with δ = 10−1. We found that DPGAN is significantly
outperformed by both DPB and MBDE, so to save space we have only included the experiment in Figure
1. We observed that DPB does not always yield a positive measure4. To ensure this property, we shift
and scale the output for positivity, without caring for privacy in doing so, which degrades the privacy
guarantee for DPB but keeps the approximation guarantees of its output Aldà and Rubinstein [2017].
Clearly, MBDE does not suffer this drawback.
. Metrics: we consider two metrics, inspired by those we consider for our theoretical analysis and one
investigated in Tolstikhin et al. [2017] for mode capture. We first investigate the ability of our method to
learn highly dense regions by computing mode coverage, which is defined to be P (dQ < t) for t such
that Q(dQ < t) = 0.95. Mode coverage essentially attempts to find high density regions of the model Q
(based on t) and computes the mass of the target P under this region. Second, we compare the negative
log likelihood, −EP [logQ] as a general loss measure.
. Domains: we essentially consider three different problems. The first is the ring Gaussians problem now
common to generative approaches Goodfellow [2016], in which 8 Gaussians have their modes regularly
spaced on a circle. The target P is shown in Figure 1. Second, we consider a mixture of three 1D
3Cf Aldà and Rubinstein [2017, Definition 4] for the sensitivity, Aldà and Rubinstein [2017, Section 6] for the key function
FH(., .) involved.
4The approach of fitting kernel density estimation in the Bernstein basis does not indeed guarantee the positivity of the
measure.
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Figure 6: Mode coverage for MBDE on 1D random Gaussian.
gaussians with pdf P (x) = 1
3
(N(0.3, 0.01) +N(0.5, 0.1) +N(0.7, 0.1)). For the final experiment, we
consider a 1D domain and randomly place m gaussians with means centered in the interval [0, 1] and
variances 0.01. We vary m = 1, . . . , 10, ε ∈ (0, 2] and repeat the experiment four times to get means and
standard deviations. Appendix (Section 9) shows more experiments.
. Results: Figure 4 displays contour plots of the learned Q against DPB [Aldà and Rubinstein, 2017].
Figure 1 in the introduction also provides additional insight in the comparison. Figure 5 provides metrics.
We indicate the metric performance for DPB on one plot only since density estimates obtained for some
of the other metrics could not allow for an accurate computation of metrics. The experiments bring
the following observations: MBDE is much better at density estimation than DPB if we look at the ring
Gaussian problem. MBDE essentially obtains the same results as DPB for values of ε that are 400 times
smaller as seen from Figure 1. We also remark that the density modelled are more smooth and regular for
MBDE in this case. One might attribute the fact that our performance is much better on the ring Gaussians
to the fact that our Q0 is a standard Gaussian, located at the middle of the ring in this case, but experiments
on random 2D Gaussians (see Appendix) display that our performances also remain better in other settings
where Q0 should represent a handicap. All domains, including the 1D random Gaussians experiments in
Figure 7 (Appendix), display a consistent decreasing NLL for MBDE as ε increases, with sometimes very
sharp decreases for ε < 2 (See also Appendix, Section 9). We attribute it to the fact that it is in this regime
of the privacy parameter that MBDE captures all modes of the mixture. For larger values of ε, it justs fits
better the modes already discovered. We also remark on the 1D Gaussians that DPB rapidly reaches a
plateau of NLL which somehow show that there is little improvement as ε increases, for ε ≥ 1. This is
not the case for MBDE, which still manages some additional improvements for ε > 5 and significantly
beats DPB. We attribute it to the flexibility of the sufficient statistics as (deep) classifiers in MBDE. The
1D random Gaussian problem (Figure 7 in Appendix) displays the same pattern for MBDE: results get
better as ε increases, and get significantly better than DPB, which does not succeed in getting improved
results with ε, indicating a privacy regime — ε remains small — where the algorithm fails learning a good
density. We also observe that the standard deviation of MBDE is often 100 times smaller than for DPB,
indicating not just better but also much more stable results. In the case of mode coverage, we observe
for several experiments (e.g. ring Gaussians) that the mode coverage decreases until ε ≈ 1, and then
increases, on all domains, for MBDE. This, we believe is due to our choice of Q0, which as a Gaussian,
already captures with its mode a part of the existing modes. As ε increases however, MBDE performs
better and obtains in general a significant improvement over Q0. We also observe this phenomenon for the
random 1D Gaussians (Figure 6) where the very small standard deviations (at least for ε > .25 or m > 1)
display a significant stability for the solutions of MBDE.
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6 Discussion
By dropping the neighboring condition on inputs, our privacy guarantee is stronger than that of classical
(or central [Differential privacy team, Apple, 2017]) DP. It is also stronger than that of the local ("on
device") DP which requires individual protection of every row in D [Differential privacy team, Apple,
2017, Definition 3.2] — equivalently, it is DP with |D| = 1. Integral privacy puts no constraint on sizes
and is therefore a good protection when groups of any/unknown size have to be protected. If we drop the
"local" constraint in local DP, the model becomes equivalent to integral privacy. This equivalence must
be considered with caution. First, local DP algorithms would typically not scale: relaxing the protection
to subsets of m′ rows would multiply the sensitivity by m′ as well. Making no assumption on m′ for
privacy (which is what integral privacy enforces) would just wipe out the protection guarantee as m′ →∞.
Second, we do not suffer this caveat but we suspect that many integral privacy algorithms would risk to
be over-conservative in a local DP setting. So, there is no "one size fits all" algorithm, which somehow
justifies two highly distinct models to accomodate for specific algorithms.
In the introduction, we highlighted how it would be a bad idea to lift DP to integral privacy by scaling
ε to the input size m. One might think that this argument holds in fact for the sampling output size k of
integral privacy for sampling, as partially discussed in the experiments. This in fact needs to be nuanced
for three reasons: (i) in relevant applications, we would have m k, as for example when the input data
is census based – thus, D is virtually equivalent to P – but the output is deliberately small sized (such
was the setting of Australia’s Medicare data breach Rubinstein et al. [2016]); (ii) we can trade part of
the scaling down of ε in MBDE by scaling down instead classifiers outputs (reducing c∗): we get ε/k
mollifiers and thus get ε-integral privacy for output samples (Appendix, Section 8.2). This allows to fine
tune the boosting convergence, even when the final guarantee is inevitably weakened. Finally, (iii) it turns
out that regardless of k, if one element of the ε/k-mollifier is close to P , then we are guaranteed that the
density learned by MBDE will be close to P as well. This is shown in Appendix (Section 8.6), as well as
the fact that such a guarantee is essentially the best we can hope for, not just for integral privacy but for
the weaker model of ε-differential privacy as well.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an extension of ε-differential privacy to handle the protection of groups
of arbitrary size, and applied it to sampling. The technique bypasses noisification as usually carried out in
DP. An efficient learning algorithm is proposed, which learns (deep) sufficient statistics for an exponential
family using classifiers. Formal approximation guarantees are obtained for this algorithm in the context
of the boosting theory, using assumptions substantially weaker than the state of the art. Experiments
demonstrate the quality of the solutions found, in particular in the context of the mode capture problem.
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8 Proofs and formal results
8.1 Proof of Lemma 4
The proof follows from two simple observations: (i) ensuring (4) is equivalent to Pr[A(d) ∈ S] ≤
exp(ε) · Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] since it has to holds for all S, and (ii) the probability to sample any S is equal to
the mass under the density from which it samples from:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] =
∫
S
dQε(x;D). (15)
Recall that base measures are assumed to be the same, so being in M translates to a property on Radon-
Nikodym derivatives, dQ/dQ′ ≤ exp(ε), and we then get the statement of the Lemma: sinceQε(x; .) ∈M
where M is a ε-mollifier, we get from Definition 3 that for any input samples D, D′ from X and any
S ⊆ X:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] =
∫
S
dQε(x;D) =
∫
S
dQε(x;D)
dQε(x;D′)
· dQε(x;D′)
≤ exp(ε) ·
∫
S
dQε(x;D
′) = exp(ε) · Pr[A(D′) ∈ S], (16)
which shows that A is ε-integrally private.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof follows from two Lemma which we state and prove.
Lemma 9 For any T ∈ N∗, we have that
T∑
t=1
θt(ε) =
T∑
t=1
(
ε
ε+ 4 log(2)
)t
<
ε
4 log(2)
. (17)
Proof Since (ε/(ε + 4 log(2)) < 1 for any ε and noting that θt(ε) = (ε/(ε + 4 log(2))θt−1(ε), we can
conclude that θt(ε) is a geometric sequence. For any geometric series with ratio r, we have that
T∑
t=1
rt = r
(
1− rT
1− r
)
(18)
=
r
1− r −
rT+1
1− r (19)
<
r
1− r (20)
Indeed, r
1−r is the limit of the geometric series above when T → ∞. In our case, we let r = (ε/(ε +
4 log(2))) to show that
r
1− r =
ε
ε+4 log(2)
1− ε
ε+4 log(2)
=
ε
ε+4 log(2)
4 log(2)
ε+4 log(2)
=
ε
4 log(2)
, (21)
which concludes the proof.
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Lemma 10 For any ε > 0 and T ∈ N∗, let θ(ε) = (θ1(ε), . . . , θT (ε)) denote the parameters and
c = (c1, . . . , ct) denote the sufficient statistics returned by Algorithm 1, then we have
−ε
2
≤ 〈θ(ε), c〉 − ϕ(θ(ε)) ≤ ε
2
. (22)
Proof Since the algorithm returns classifiers such that ct(x) ∈ [− log 2, log 2] for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T , we have
from Lemma 9,
T∑
t=1
θt(ε)ct ≤ log(2)
T∑
t=1
θt(ε) < log(2)
ε
4 log(2)
=
ε
4
, (23)
and similarly,
T∑
t=1
θt(ε)ct ≥ − log(2)
T∑
t=1
θt(ε) > − log(2) ε
4 log(2)
= −ε
4
. (24)
Thus we have
−ε
4
≤ 〈θ(ε), c〉 ≤ ε
4
. (25)
By taking exponential, integrand (w.r.t Q0) and logarithm of ??, we get
log
∫
X
exp
(
−ε
4
)
dQ0 ≤ log
∫
X
exp (〈θ(ε), c〉) dQ0 ≤ log
∫
X
exp
(ε
4
)
dQ0 (26)
−ε
4
≤ ϕ(θ(ε)) ≤ ε
4
(27)
Since 〈θ(ε), c〉 ∈ [−ε/4, ε/4] and ϕ(θ(ε)) ∈ [−ε/4, ε/4], the proof concludes by considering highest and
lowest values.
The proof of Theorem 5 now follows from taking the exp of all quantities in (22), which makes appear
QT in the middle and conditions for membership to Mε in the bounds.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 6
We begin by first deriving the KL drop expression. At each iteration, we learn a classifier ct, fix some
step size θ > 0 and multiply Qt−1 by exp(θ · ct) and renormalize to get a new distribution which we will
denote by Qt(θ) to make the dependence of θ explicit.
Lemma 11 For any θ > 0, let ϕ(θ) = log
∫
X
exp(θ · ct)dQt−1. The drop in KL is
DROP(θ) := KL(P,Qt−1)− KL(P,Qt(θ)) = θ ·
∫
X
ctdP − ϕ(θ) (28)
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Proof Note that Qt(θ) is indeed a one dimensional exponential family with natural parameter θ, sufficient
statistic ct, log-partition function ϕ(θ) and base measure Qt−1. We can write out the KL divergence as
KL(P,Qt−1)− KL(P,Qt(θ)) =
∫
X
log
(
P
Qt−1
)
dP −
∫
X
log
(
P
exp(θ · ct − ϕ(θ))Qt−1
)
dP (29)
=
∫
X
log
(
exp(θ · ct − ϕ(θ))Qt−1
Qt−1
)
dP (30)
=
∫
X
θ · ct − ϕ(θ)dP (31)
= θ ·
∫
X
ctdP − ϕ(θ) (32)
It is not hard to see that the drop is indeed a concave function of θ, suggesting that there exists an optimal
step size at each iteration. We split our analysis by considering two cases and begin when γtQ < 1/3.
Since θ > 0, we can lowerbound the first term of the KL drop using WLA. The trickier part however, is
bounding ϕ(θ) which we make use of Hoeffding’s lemma.
Lemma 12 (Hoeffding’s Lemma) Let X be a random variable with distribution Q, with a ≤ X ≤ b
such that EQ[X] = 0, then for all λ > 0, we have
EQ[exp(λ ·X)] ≤ exp
(
λ2(b− a)2
8
)
(33)
Lemma 13 For any classifier ct satisfying Assumption 1 (WLA), we have
EQt−1 [exp(θt(ε) · ct)] ≤ exp
(
θ2t (ε) ·
(c∗t )
2
2
− θt(ε) · γtQ · c∗t
)
(34)
Proof Let X = ct − ·EQt−1 [ct], b = c∗t , a = −c∗t and λ = θt(ε) and noticing that
EQt−1 [λ ·X] = EQt−1 [ct − EQt−1 [ct]] = EQt−1 [ct]− EQt−1 [ct] = 0, (35)
allows us to apply Lemma 12. By first realizing that
exp(λ ·X) = exp(θt(ε) · ct) · exp(θt(ε) · EQt−1 [−ct]), (36)
We get that
EQt−1 [exp(θt(ε) · ct)] · exp
(
θt(ε) · EQt−1 [−ct]
) ≤ exp(θ2t (ε) · (c∗t )22
)
. (37)
Re-arranging and using the WLA inequality yields
EQt−1 [exp(θt(ε) · ct)] ≤ exp
(
θ2t (ε) ·
(c∗t )
2
2
− θt(ε) · EQt−1 [−ct]
)
(38)
≤ exp
(
θ2t (ε) ·
(c∗t )
2
2
− θt(ε) · γtQ · c∗t
)
(39)
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Applying Lemma 13 and Lemma 11 (writing Qt = Qt(ε) ) together gives us
KL(P,Qt) = KL(P,Qt−1)− DROP(θt(ε)) (40)
= KL(P,Qt−1)− θt(ε) ·
∫
X
ctdP + logEQt−1 [exp(θt(ε) · ct)] (41)
≤ KL(P,Qt−1)− c∗t · θt(ε) ·
(
1
c∗t
∫
X
ctdP
)
+
(
θ2t (ε) ·
(c∗t )
2
2
− θt(ε) · γtQ · c∗t
)
(42)
≤ KL(P,Qt−1)− c∗t θt(ε)
(
γtP + γ
t
Q −
c∗t · θt(ε)
2
)
(43)
Now we move to the case of γtQ ≥ 1/3.
Lemma 14 For any classifier ct returned by Algorithm 1, we have that
EQt−1 [exp(ct)] ≤ exp
(−Γ(γtQ)) (44)
where Γ(z) = log(4/(5− 3z)).
Proof Consider the straight line between (− log 2, 1/2) and (log 2, 2) given by y = 5/4+(3/(4 · log 2))x,
which by convexity is greater then y = exp(x) on the interval [− log 2, log 2]. To this end, we define the
function
f(x) =
{
5
4
+ 3
4·log 2 · x, if x ∈ [− log 2, log 2]
0, otherwise
(45)
Since ct(x) ∈ [− log 2, log 2] for all x ∈ X, we have that f(ct(x)) ≥ exp(ct(x)) for all x ∈ X. Taking
EQt−1 [·] over both sides and using linearity of expectation gives
EQt−1 [exp(ct(x))] ≤ EQt−1 [f(ct(x))] (46)
=
5
4
+
3
4 log 2
(
EQt−1 [ct(x)]
)
(47)
=
5
4
− 3
4
(
1
log 2
EQt−1 [−ct(x)]
)
(48)
<
5
4
− 3
4
γtQ (49)
= exp
(
− log
(
5− 3γtQ
4
)−1)
(50)
= exp
(
− log
(
4
5− 3γtQ
))
(51)
= exp
(−Γ(γtQ)) , (52)
as claimed.
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Now we use Lemma 11 and Jensen’s inequality since θt(ε) < 1 so that
KL(P,Qt) = KL(P,Qt−1)− DROP(θ) (53)
= KL(P,Qt−1)− θt(ε) ·
∫
X
ctdP + logEQt−1 [exp(θt · ct)] (54)
≤ KL(P,Qt−1)− θt(ε) · EP [ct] + θt · logEQt−1 [exp(ct)] (55)
≤ KL(P,Qt−1)− θt(ε)
(
EP [ct]− logEQt−1 [exp(ct)]
)
(56)
= KL(P,Qt−1)− θt(ε)
(
c∗t
(
1
c∗t
EP [ct]
)
− logEQt−1 [exp(ct)]
)
(57)
< KL(P,Qt−1)− θt(ε)
(
c∗tγ
t
P − log
(
exp
(−Γ(γtQ)))) (58)
= KL(P,Qt−1)− θt(ε)
(
c∗tγ
t
P + Γ(γ
t
Q)
)
. (59)
8.4 Proof of Theorem 7
We first note that for any Q ∈Mexpε ,
KL(P,Q) =
∫
X
log
(
P
Q
)
dP (60)
=
∫
X
log
(
P
Q0 exp (〈θ(ε), c〉 − ϕ(θ(ε)))
)
dP (61)
=
∫
X
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP −
∫
X
(〈θ(ε), c〉 − ϕ(θ(ε))) dP (62)
≥ KL(P,Q0)−
∫
X
ε
2
dP (63)
≥ KL(P,Q0)− ε
2
, (64)
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which completes the proof of (10). To show (10), we have that
KL(P,Qt) ≤ KL(P,QT−1)− θt(ε) · Λt (65)
≤ KL(P,Q0)−
T−1∑
t=1
θt(ε) · Λt (66)
= KL(P,Q0)−
T−1∑
t=1
θt(ε) ·
(
c∗tγ
t
P + Γ(γ
t
Q)
)
(67)
≤ KL(P,Q0)−
T−1∑
t=1
θt(ε) · (log 2 · γP + Γ(γQ)) (68)
≤ KL(P,Q0)− (log 2 · γP + log 2 · γQ) ·
T−1∑
t=1
θt(ε) (69)
≤ KL(P,Q0)− (log 2 · γP + log 2 · γQ) ·
T−1∑
t=1
θt(ε) (70)
= KL(P,Q0)− log 2 · (γP + γQ) · θ1(ε) ·
(
1− θt(ε)
1− θ1(ε)
)
(71)
= KL(P,Q0)− ε ·
(
γP + γQ
4
)
· (1− θt(ε)) , (72)
where we used the fact that Γ(x) ≥ log 2 · x and explicit geometric summation expression.
8.5 Proof of Theorems 8
We start by a general Lemma.
Lemma 15 For any region of the support B, we have that∫
B
dQt ≥
∫
B
dP −
∫
B
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP (73)
Proof By first noting that for any region B,∫
B
(dP − dQt) =
∫
B
(
1− dQt
dP
)
dP (74)
we then use the inequality 1− x ≤ log(1/x) to get∫
B
(dP − dQt) =
∫
B
(
1− dP
dQt
)
dP ≤
∫
B
log
(
dP
dQt
)
dP =
∫
B
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP (75)
Re-arranging the above inequality gives us the bound.
Lemma 15 allows us to understand the relationship between two distributions P and Qt in terms regions
they capture. The general goal is to show that for a given region B (which includes the highly dense
mode regions), the amount of mass captured by the model
∫
B
dQt, is lower bounded by the target mass∫
B
dP , and some small quantity. The inequality in Lemma 15 comments on this precisely with the small
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difference being a term that looks familiar to the KL-divergence - rather one that is bound to the specific
region B. Though, this term can be understood to be small since by Theorem 6, we know that the global
KL decreases, we give further refinements to show the importance of privacy parameters ε. We show that
the term
∫
B
log(P/Qt)dP can be decomposed in different ways, leading to our two Theorems to prove.
Lemma 16 ∫
B
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP ≤
∫
B
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP −∆ + ε
2
(
1−
∫
B
dP
)
. (76)
where ∆ = KL(P,Q0)−KL(P,Qt)
Proof We decompose the space X into B and the complement Bc to get∫
B
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP =
∫
X
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP −
∫
Bc
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP (77)
= KL(P,Qt)−
∫
Bc
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP (78)
≤ KL(P,Q0)−∆−
∫
Bc
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP, (79)
where we used Theorem 6, and letting θ = θ(ε) for brevity, we also have∫
Bc
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP =
∫
Bc
log
(
P
Q0 exp (〈θ, c〉 − ϕ(θ))
)
dP (80)
=
∫
Bc
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP −
∫
Bc
exp (〈θ, c〉 − ϕ(θ)) dP (81)
≥
∫
Bc
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP −
∫
Bc
ε
2
dP (82)
=
∫
Bc
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP − ε
2
(
1−
∫
B
dP
)
(83)
Combining these inequalities together gives us:∫
B
log
(
P
Qt
)
dP ≤ KL(P,Q0)−∆−
(∫
Bc
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP − ε
2
(
1−
∫
B
dP
))
(84)
=
∫
X
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP −
∫
Bc
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP −∆ + ε
2
(
1−
∫
B
dP
)
(85)
=
∫
B
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP −∆ + ε
2
(
1−
∫
B
dP
)
(86)
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 8. Using Lemma 16 into the inequality in Lemma 15 yields∫
B
dQt ≥
∫
B
dP −
(∫
B
log
(
P
Q0
)
dP −∆ + ε
2
(
1−
∫
B
dP
))
(87)
=
(
1 +
ε
2
)∫
B
dP − ε
2
−
∫
B
log
(
P
Q0
)
+ ∆. (88)
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Reorganising and using the Theorem’s notations, we get
M(B,Q) ≥ M(B,P )−KL(P,Q0;B) + ε
2
· J(P,Q;B, ε), (89)
where we recall that J(P,Q;B, ε) .= M(B,P ) + 2∆(Q)
ε
− 1. Theorem 7 says that we have in the high
boosting regime 2∆(QT )/ε ≥ (γP + γQ)/2 − θT (ε) · (γP + γQ)/2. Letting γ .= (γP + γQ)/2 and
K
.
= 4 log 2, we have from MBDE in the high boosting regime:
2∆(Q)
ε
≥ γ ·
1−( 1
1 + K
ε
)T
≥ γ ·
(
1− 1
1 + TK
ε
)
= γ · TK
TK + ε
. (90)
To have J(P,Q;B, ε) ≥ −(2/ε) · αM(B,P ), it is thus sufficient that
M(B,P ) ≥ 1
1 + 2α
ε
·
(
1− γ · TK
TK + ε
)
= ε · ε+ (1− γ)TK
(ε+ 2α)(ε+ TK)
. (91)
In this case, we check that we have from (89)
M(B,Q) ≥ (1− α)M(B,P )−KL(P,Q0;B), (92)
as claimed.
8.6 Additional formal results
One might ask what such a strong model of privacy as integral privacy allows to keep from the accuracy
standpoint in general. Perhaps paradoxically at first sight, it is not hard to show that integral privacy
can bring approximation guarantees on learning: if we learn Qε within an ε-mollifier M (hence, we
get ε-integral privacy for sampling from Qε), then each time some Qε in M accurately fits P , we are
guaranteed that the one we learn also accurately fits P — albeit eventually more moderately —. We let
Qε(; .) denote the density learned, where . is the dataset argument.
Lemma 17 Suppose ∃ ε-mollifier M s.t. Qε ∈ M, then (∃P,D′, δ : KL(P,Qε(;D′)) ≤ δ) ⇒
(∀D,KL(P,Qε(;D)) ≤ δ + ε).
Proof The proof is straightforward; we give it for completeness: for any dataset D, we have
KL(P,Qε(;D)) =
∫
X
log
(
P
Qε(;D)
)
dP (93)
=
∫
X
log
(
P
Qε(;D′)
)
dP +
∫
X
log
(
Qε(;D)
Qε(;D′)
)
dP (94)
≤
∫
X
log
(
P
Qε(;D′)
)
dP + ε ·
∫
X
dP (95)
= KL(P,Qε(;D′)) + ε (96)
≤ δ + ε, (97)
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from which we derive the statement of Lemma 17 assuming A is ε-IP (the inequalities follow from the
Lemma’s assumption).
In the jargon of (computational) information geometry Boissonnat et al. [2010], we can summarize
Lemma 17 as saying that if there exists an eligible5 density in a small KL-ball relatively to P , we are
guaranteed to find a density also in a small KL-ball relatively to P . This result is obviously good when
the premises hold true, but it does not tell the full story when they do not. In fact, when there exists an
eligible density outside a big KL-ball relatively to P , it is not hard to show using the same arguments
as for the Lemma that we cannot find a good one, and this is not a feature of MBDE: this would hold
regardless of the algorithm. This limitation is intrinsic to the likelihood ratio constraint of differential
privacy in (1) and not to the neighborhing constraint that we alleviate in integral privacy. It is therefore
also a limitation of classical ε-differential privacy, as the following Lemma shows. In the context of ε-DP,
we assume that all input datasets have the same size, say m.
Lemma 18 Let A denote an algorithm learning an ε-differentially private density. Denote D ∼ P an
input of the algorithm and Qε(D) the set of all densities that can be the output of A on input D, taking in
considerations all internal randomisations of A. Suppose there exists an input D′ for which one of these
densities is far from the target: ∃D′,∃Q ∈ Qε(D′) : KL(P,Q(;D′)) ≥ ∆ for some "big" ∆ > 0. Then
the output Q of A obtained from any input D ∼ P satisfies: KL(P,Q(;D)) ≥ ∆−mε.
Proof Denote D the actual input of A. There exists a sequence D of datasets of the same size, whose
length is at most m, which transforms D into D′ by repeatedly changing one observation in the current
dataset: call it D = {D,D1, D2, ..., Dk, D′}, with k ≤ m − 1. Denote Q(;D′′) any element of Qε(D′′)
for D′′ ∈ D. Since A is ε-differentially private, we have:
∆ ≤ KL(P,Q(;D′)) (98)
=
∫
X
log
(
P
Q(;D′)
)
dP (99)
=
∫
X
log
(
P
Q(;D)
)
dP +
∫
X
log
(
Q(;D)
Q(;D1)
)
dP +
k−1∑
j=1
∫
X
log
(
Q(;Dj)
Q(;Dj+1)
)
dP +
∫
X
log
(
Q(;Dk)
Q(;D′)
)
dP
(100)
= KL(P,Q(;D)) +
∫
X
log
(
Q(;D)
Q(;D1)
)
dP +
k−1∑
j=1
∫
X
log
(
Q(;Dj)
Q(;Dj+1)
)
dP +
∫
X
log
(
Q(;Dk)
Q(;D′)
)
dP
(101)
≤ KL(P,Q(;D)) +mε, (102)
from which we derive the statement of Lemma 18.
5Within the chosen ε-mollifier.
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Figure 7: NLL metrics (mean and standard deviation) on the 1D random Gaussian problem for DPB (left
pane) and MBDE (right pane), for a varying number of m = 1, . . . , 10 random Gaussians. The lower the
better on each metric. Remark the different scales for StDev (see text).
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Figure 8: Randomly placed Gaussian convergence comparison for DPB (upper) against MBDE (lower).
9 Additional experiments
We provide here additional results to the main file. Figure 7 provides NLL values for the random 1D
Gaussian problem. Figure 8 displays that picking Q0 a standard Gaussian does not prevent to obtain good
results — and beat DPB — when sampling random Gaussians.
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